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IS IT THE MINOR'S RIGHT: 
THE MINOR'S ABORTION DECISION IN VIRGINIA 
J. Thompson Cravens· 
Brian Fowler· 
The Abortion Right 
In the 1973 landmark decision of Roe v. Wadel, the united 
states Supreme Court upheld the fundamental constitutional right 
of women to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy. 
Since that time "there has been a political backlash [at the 
state level] to limit and destroy that right.,,2 In Virginia, 
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2 Note, Restrictions on the Abortion Rights of Minors, 3 Harvard 
Womens law Journal, 119 (1980). The case law denotes the backlash to the 
abortion decision in Roe v. Wade as well. Note: Planned Parenthood of 
central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), (court invalidated 
portions of a Missouri statute which inposed spousal and parental consent 
requirements). Beal v. D:le and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), (compa-
nion cases on the question of medicaid funding of abortions). Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), (court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts 
statute requiring parental consent and absolute veto power over the 
abortion decision of a minor child). H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S.ct. 1164 
(1981), (state statute requiring physician to notify minor's parents before 
performing an abortion on their minor child held constitutional). city of 
Akron v. Akron center for Reproductive Health. Inc .. et aI, 462 U.S. 416 
(1983), (local ordinance requiring all abortions performed after first 
trimester to be performed in a hospital held unconstitutional, the section 
declaring all minors under age of 15 incapable of making an abortion 
decision as a mature person and providing t.hp.t abortion is only in minor's 
best interest when parents' consent held unconstitutional, section requir-
ing a waiting period of 24 hours held unconstitutional). Planned Parent-
hood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), (Missouri statute requiring 
all abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy to be performed in a hospital 
held unconstitutional because it "unreasonably infringes on a woman's 
constitutional right to obtain an abortion." J. Powell at 476.). simoPOu-
los v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, (1983), (court upheld a Virginia abortion 
statute requiring all second trimester abortions to be performed in 
2 
attempts to regulate abortions have focused on minors and their 
procreation decisions. Generally, states have attempted to 
regulate minor~' procreation decisions by restricting physicians 
from performing abortions on minors without parental consent or 
notification. Though unsuccessful in virginia, parental consent 
bills have been proposed in the Virginia Assembly in both the 
1985 and the 1986 sessions. 3 
Currently in Virginia a pregnant minor may go to any 
abortion clinic in the state and receive an abortion if she is 
still in the first trimester of her pregnancy and has the money 
to pay for the procedure. The minor is not required to have an 
adult present nor is she required to notify her parents or obtain 
their consent. Some clinics impose age· restr i ctions and will 
accept young women under the age of 14 only if .lccompanied by a 
parent or legal guardian. Minors in the second trimester of 
pregnancy may also receive an abortion; but the procedure must be 
performed in a licensed hospital. 4 The hospital is not required 
to be a "general-acute care facility", a licensed outpatient 
clinic falls under the term hospital as provided by statute. The 
recently proposed legislation would force a pregnant minor to 
either: 1) have the consent of one of her parents or legal 
guardians for an abortion br 2) make application to the juvenile 
and domestic relations district court for that court to determine 
whether or not to authorize an abortion for the minor. The 
decision would be based upon a showing by the minor that she is 
licensed outpatient clinics because it was not an unreasonable infringe-
ment, unlike Akron and Ashcroft where abortions were required to be 
performed in "general, acute-care facilities."). 
3 1985 Session, House Bill m.Dl1ber 1364 "requirements for abortions for 
minors," proposed by Delegate Morrison, Pass€d House of Delegates. senate 
Cormnittee for Courts of Justice amended 1364. The House rejected the 
amendment by the Senate. 
1986 Session, Senate Bill number 342 proposed by Senator Goode, killed 
in Senate Cormnittee on Education and Health. 
4 See Simopoulos v. Virginia, supra at note 2. 
3 
"sufficiently mature and well informed,,5 or that the abortion is 
in the "best interest,,6 of the minor. 
History of Children's Rights 
At common law, minors had only limited personal rights other 
than general rights to receive minimal parental or state care. 7 
Today, "[w]hile a child is not beyond constitutional protection 
simply because of minority, the court has traditionally acknow-
ledged three reasons why the rights of minors cannot be equalled 
with those of adults: first, [it has recognized] the 'peculiar 
vulnerability' of children. Second, the court has limited 
freedom in those areas where children may be unable to make 
critical decisions in an informed manner. Third, the court .•. 
[has recognized] the parental role in child rearing, and 
found parental influence and authority over the child [to be] 
preferable to that of the state. ,,8 Historically minors were 
required to obtain parental consent for medical treatment9 as it 
was presumed that a minor could not give such consent10 because 
of his lack of "experience, knowledge, and maturity."ll "Today 
this legal concept is reflected in many restrictions of minors' 
5 1986 Senate Bill Number 342 at 3. 
6 Ibid. 
7 supra note 2, 3 Harvard Womens law Journal, at 122. 
8 Note, Statute requiring parental consent fOlmd to tmconstitutionally 
burden right to abortion, Bellotti v. Baird, 18 Journal of Family law 403, 
at 405. 
9 see generally Pilpel, Minor's Rights to Medical care, 36 AlB. L. 
Rev. 462 (1972). 
10 see: Pilpel, supra note 8, Note, Sexual Privacy: A=ess of a Minor 
to COntraception, Abortion and sterilization Without Parental COnsent, 12 
U. Richmond L. Rev. 221 (1977), Note, Minor's Rights of Privacy: Limita-
tions on state Action After Danforth and carey, 77 COlum. L. Rev. 1216, 
1222 nn. 41 and 42. 
11 Note, '!he Minor's Right to COnsent to Abortion: How Far is 
Oklahoma From Akron? 37 Okla. L. Rev. 780, 786 (1984). 
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rights that further the significant state interest12 of compen-
sating for a minor's incapacity.,,13 Minors a-re not free to 
contract, vote, or work- when and where they please. states and 
the federal government have imposed regulations to protect minors 
in the workplace. The freedoms guaranteed to all who are 
legally present in the United states14 may be restricted with 
regard to minors. 15 
The court in In re Gault16 extended to minors the guarantees 
of procedural due process. 17 In other areas such as school 
desegregation, the Court assumed that a child's constitutional 
right to equal protection of the laws was the same as adults. 18 
Gault was a significant doctrinal advance because of the focus of 
the decision on the constitutionality of differing procedural 
12 Note, Parental Notice statutes: Permisible state Regulation of 
Minor's Abortion Decision, 49 Fordham L. Rev. 81, 96 (1980), citing 
(Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1979) (Bellotti II); ~ 
v. carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978). 
13 Ibid. citing generally, PlaJUled Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52,102 (1976) (Stevens, J. concurring in part arx:1 dissenting in 
part); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968) (Stewart, J., 
COl1O.lITing); J. calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 8-1, 8-4, 
at 230, 235 (2d ed. 1977); W. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts 18, 
134, at 102, 996-99 (4th ed. 1971) Note, Parent, Child, arx:1 the Decision to 
Abort: A critique of the Suprema Court's statutory Proposal in Bellotti 
v. Baird, 52 S. cal. L. Rev. 1869, at 1871-72 (1979). 
14 See Bridges v. Wixon 326 U.S. 135 (1945), (all persons legally 
within the borders of the United states are subject to the guarantees of 
the Constitution). 
15 See generally PlaJUled Parenthood v. Danforth, and Ginsberg v. New 
York, supra, note 12. 
16 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
17 Foye, supra note 11, at 97. 
18 Note, The SUprema Court arx:1 a Minor's Abortion Decision, 80 
Colum. L. Rev. 1251, 1253 (1980), (citing at n. 9 Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 490-92 (1954}). 
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standards accorded adults and juveniles. 19 The court has also 
emphasized that "[a] minor's first amendment rights may be 
abridged or limited in ways not permissible if the rights of 
adults were involved.,,20 The argument that constitutional rights 
may not be restricted solely because of age based restrictions is 
flawed however. "The Constitution itself recognized attainment 
of a certain age as a prerequisite to the exercise of some 
rights. 1121 
The state has traditionally been granted great latitude in 
the regulation of minors' conduct. The question of when a state 
may permissibly restrict a minor's right to an abortion was not 
completely answered by the resolution of the parental consent 
issues in the Danforth~ and Bellotti23 cases. 24 In H.L. v. Ma-
theson,25 the court's holding concerning the constitutionality of 
a Utah statute that required parental notification by a physician 
prior to performing an abortion on a minor was limited to 
dependent, unemancipated minors who failed to make a showing of 
19 Id. at 1253. 
20 49 Fordham L. Rev., supra note 11, at 98. see n. 83 =nparing 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-40, 645 (1968) (cannot sell to 
minors certain obscene materials which can be sold to adults) with Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969) 
(minors first amerx:lment right to wear black annbands to protest Vietnam war 
cannot be arbitrarily abridged). The Tinker court emphsized that minor's 
first amerrlment rights may not be arbitrarily restricted. Id. at 505-507. 
21 Ibid., citing at n. 82, U.S. Const. Art. I 2, cl. 2 (age of 25 to 
be a member of House of Representatives); U.S. Const. art. I 3, c1. 3 
(age of 30 to be Senator); U.S. Const. Art. II, 1, cl .. 5 (age of 35 to be 
President); see U.S. Const. amend. XXVI, 1 (right to vote afforded those 
18 or older) • 
22 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
23 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
24 Okla. L. Rev" supra note 10, at 796. 
25 H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
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maturity. 26 Obviously, determining the constitutionality of the 
proposed Virginia abortion consent legislation would be specula-
tive. The Court has, however, enumerated several requirements 
that statutes must meet to be deemed constitutional. This paper 
will apply those standards to the proposed legislation and 
determine whether or not the proposed statutes fulfill the 
enumerated requirements. 
Why Parental Consent? 
statutes requiring parental consent for a minor's abortion 
have been justified on several grounds. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that a state can restrict a minor's constitutional 
rights because of the minor's vulnerability, the minor's inabil-
ity to make an informed decision, and the countervailing inter-
ests of the minor's parents. 27 In Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth, the court held that no state had the 
constitutional authority to give parents or any third party an 
absolute veto power over the decision of a doctor and the minor 
to terminate the minor's pregnancy.28 However, the court also 
stated that the holding "does not suggest that every minor, 
regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for 
termination of her pregnancy.n29 
As noted before, in Bellotti III the Court found unconstitu-
tional a Massachusetts statute that required parental or judicial 
consent before an unmarried minor could have an abortion. The 
statute was struck down because it failed to allow mature minors 
to have an abortion without parental consent and it did not 
provide the minor with an opportunity to obtain a jUdicial 
determination that she was mature enough to consent to an 
26 Id. at 407. 
27 Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622, 634. 
28 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
29 Id. at 75. 
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abortion or that, while not mature, the abortion would be in her 
best interest. 30 Recognizing the significant state interest in 
supporting the role of parents in child-rearing, however, the 
court stated that parental consent is a qualification that 
typically may be imposed on a minor's right to make important 
decisions. 31 The Court explained 
"as immature minors often lack the ability to make 
fully informed choices that take account of both 
immediate and long-range consequences, a state reason-
ably may determine that parental consultation often is 
desirable and in the best interest of the minor. It 
may further determine that such consultation is 
particularly desirable with respect to the abortion 
decision ..•. There can be little doubt that the state 
furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encour-
aging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and 
advice of her parents in making the very important 
decision whether or not to bear a child. n32 
A young girl seeking an abortion is under a great amount of 
emotional stress. Frightened and confused she may be ill-equip-
ped to make her decision without mature advice and support. 33 
The court has expressed concern that if that advice does not corne 
from her parents, the minor may not get it elsewhere. Abortion 
clinics would not likely provide adequate counsel since a 
decision not to abort would be contrary to their financial 
interest. 34 
The Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed the significant 
state interest in protecting parental authority over the rearing 
of children. 35 This relationship between parent and child is 
30 Bellotti, at 651. 
31 Id. at 640. 
31 Id. at 640-641. 
33 Id. at 641. 
34 49 Fordham L. Rev. 100, supra at note 11, at n. 96. 
35 Matheson at 410. 
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constitutionally protected. 36 In Matheson, the court restated 
that parents have an important guiding role to play in the 
upbringing of their children and that this includes counseling 
them on important decisions. 37 
Parental consent and notice statutes also serve a signifi-
cant state interest by providing an opportunity for parents to 
supply essential medical and other information to a physician. 38 
The decision to have an abortion, especially when the patient is 
immature, can have lasting medical, emotional and psychological 
consequences. 39 Parents can provide medical and psychological 
data that may be important to the physician. Parents may also be 
able to refer the physician to other sources of relevant data, 
such as a family physician. 40 
The recent Supreme Court decisions on the abortion issue 
show that constitutional justification for parental consent 
statutes is not lacking. They serve important state interests. 
The important issue to be considered is 9rocedurally, how does a 
state preserve the minor's right and simoultaneously protect her 
interest when they may conflict. 
Judicial consent 
It is clear from the decision of the Court in Bellotti that 
a state may require parental consent if it also provides a 
judicial or administrative procedure that the minor could use 
without first notifying her parents. 41 The court stated, "[w]e 
conclude ..• that every minor must have the opportunity - if she so 
36 Id. at 410. 
37 Id. at 410. 
38 Id. at 411. 
39 Id. at 41l. 
40 Id. at 411. 
41 Bellotti v. Baird, at 647. 
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desires - to go directly to a court without first consulting or 
notifying her parents .,,42 Justice Stevens, however, questioned 
the Powell model. 43 There is a strong argument that II [t] he 
burden of initiating judicial proceedings would raise formidable 
obstacles to the exercise of abortion rights by minors, who 
generally are among those with 'little access to legal help,."44 
This argument may not be as meritorious as it first ap-
pears. Those physicians and clinics that perform abortions are 
professional, and should be very familiar with judicial 
procedures. They would inform a minor that she must have either 
parental or judicial consent before an abortion may be perform-
ed. The clinics, for business purposes, would surely keep all of 
the forms and petitions that would be necessary to commence 
judicial proceedings. Thus, the obstacle of knowing how to 
initiate proceedings and initiating those proceedings in fact 
could be circumvented or hurdle,d by the cl inics themselves. The 
proposed Virginia statutes also provide that the minor or next 
friend shall make application to the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court, and the clerk, on request, will assist in 
preparing the petition and notices. 45 It may therefore be the 
case that a judicial proceeding is not in fact an unconsti-
tutional burden on the child bearing minor. 
There are however more compelling arguments that a judicial 
proceeding is a formidable obstacle unconstitutionally impeding 
the ~ight of minors to abort. 
the recollection that " ... a 
We must view these obstacles with 
abortion decision 
42 Ibid. 
without 
regulation which 
unduly burdening 
43 (stevens, J. concurring at 656 n. 4). 
impinges 
it will 
on the 
survive 
44 Note, The Supreme COurt and the Minor's Abortion Decision, 80 
COlurn. L. Rev. 1251, 1261 (1980) (citing at n. 58; FUentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 83 n. 13 (1972). See also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 
(2nd Cir. 1977) (noting "the burden of initiating judicial review")). 
45 Senate Bill Number 342, at 3. 
10 
constitutional attack if it reasonably furthers a proper state 
purpose.,,46 
Many commentators rtote the impor~ance of timing in abortion 
procedures. It is quite possible that a delay in the abortion 
process to allow for a judicial determination could potentially 
deny a minor her constitutional right to abort during the 
appropriate trimester. The proposed Virginia statute however 
requires a hearing on the merits " ... as soon as possible but no 
later than five days after the filing of the petition.,,47 
Further, the proposed legislation requires that the Court render 
a decree " ... within forty-eight hours of the hearing.,,48 
This statute thus grants the Court a total of seven days to 
dispense of a minor's petition for an abortion. Though this may 
be a burden on the minor's right to abort, it appears to be a 
permissable burden. The Court in Bellotti by requiring a 
jUdicial alternative surely envisioned that this alternative 
would require at least some delay in t.he abortion process. The 
Virginia proposal strictly specifies that the Court shall hear 
the petition and render a decree - "as expeditiously as pos-
sible,,49 and further places an absolute time limitation on the 
court. It thus strictly denotes that time is a critical factor 
in the abortion process and speaks to limit the burden placed on 
the minor by the judicial determination. For these reasons, it 
appears that the proposed statute does not create an impermis-
46 Note, state statute requiring both parental consent and court order 
for urnnarried minors seeking abortions and spousal notification and 
consultation for married women seeking abortions held unconstitutional, 19 
Journal of Family law 149, 151 (1980). Note cites Scheinberg v. Smith, 
482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979). 
47 Senate Bill Number 342, at 3. 
48 Id; at 4. 
49 Id. at 3,4. 
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sable delay in the abortion process. 50 
The proposed statute conforms to Justice Powell's suggested 
model of a judicial alternative set forth in Bellotti. 51 It 
specifically states what three decisions the court may reach. 
The court may find that the minor is mature and "grant majority 
rights for the purpose of consenting to the abortion,,52, or the 
court may find that an abortion is in the "best interest,,53 of 
the minor and give judicial consent for the abortion. The court 
may also deny the petition, but the statute requires that the 
Court set forth the grounds for the denial. 54 
It has been suggested that there is no basis for assuming 
the improvidence of a minor, and that without that assumption 
there is inadequate constitutional justification for imposing 
upon her the burden of proving her entitlement to the exercise of 
a constitutional right. 55 However, as has previously been 
discussed in this article, the law has traditionally limited the 
scope of minors' rights on the presumption of their incapacity. 
50 See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1535 (7th Cir. 1985) (Illinois 
parental consent statute providing district judicial consent alternative to 
minor upheld. Time requirements inherent in process not deemed unconstitu-
tional burden on minors rights. Section of act imposing a twenty-four hour 
waiting period held unconstitutional and severable from act) Act cited at 
Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (N.D. Illinois, E.D. 1984). 
51 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), at 643-647. 
52 Senate Bill number 342 at 4. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1251, supra at note 43, at 1262, citing at n. 60 
(Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 - 26 (1958) (unconstitutional 
obstruction of a fundamental right though the state's .allocation of the 
burden of proof in litigation regarding the right); cf. Addington v. Texas, 
441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (determination of standard of proof on basis of 
iITportance of the interests of the litigants affected by the judgment). 
Compare Shuttlesworth v; Birmimham, 394 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1969), with 
Niemohko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276-86 (1951) (Frankfurther, J., 
concurring) (constitutionality of administrative denials of permission to 
exercise constitutional rights)). 
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The fact that the Court has placed the burden on a minor to prove 
either that she is mature or that an abortion is in her best 
interest is adequately justified. This ruling reflects the 
traditional notion that during the formative years, "minors often 
lack the experience, perspective, and judgement to recognize and 
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them."56 If the state 
may constitutionally restrict this right, and the minor falls in 
the category of restricted persons, it is proper that she bear 
the burden of showing why this constitutional restriction should 
not apply. 
The proposed Virginia statutes appear to be constitutional. 
Their purpose is to protect the states' interest in the parent, 
the minor, the fetus, and the family. The states' interests are 
served when a minor's best interests are protected, and her 
heal th is not placed in jeopardy. "[T]he state has a parens 
patriae interest in preventing improvident decisions by mi-
nors."57 
Recent Development 
On June 11, 1986, the United states Supreme Court in a 5-4 
vote decided Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians. 58 
At issue in the case was the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 
1982. This act attempted to strictly re<;Julate abortion proce-
dures in the state and was held unconstitutional because the 
legislation was overbroad, it did not serve a legitimate state 
interest, it constituted an invasion into the privacy of the 
intimately personal abortion decision, and it had an overall 
"chilling effect" on the exercise of a constitutional right. The 
56 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). 
57 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428U.S. 52,73,75 (1976). 
58 Thornburgh v. American College of 
495 (U.S. June 11, 1986) (available June 
Genfed library, U.S. file). 
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Obstetricians, No. 84-
15, 1986, on lEXIS, 
Court cited its previous decisions in Ashcroft59 , Simopoulos60 , 
Roe v. Wade61 , Danforth62 , and Akron63 ; and it relied on the 
precedents established ih these decisions to declare the Pennsyl-
vania Abortion Control Act unconstitutional. 
The court in Thornburgh clarified its earlier decisions. It 
announced that state ordinances that "raised a ~pectre of public 
exposure and harrassment of women who choose to exercise their 
personal, intensely private, right, ... "64 would not be tolerat-
ed. The Court further ruled that no statute may require a 
physician to make a " ... 'trade-off' between the woman's health 
and fetal survival, and [all abortion control statutes must) 
require that maternal health be the physician's paramount 
consideration. "65 
The crux of the decision lay in the dicta of the opinion. 
The court emphatically spoke to the question of whether abortion 
was a freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. It noted that 
those rights publicly afforded to women by the Roe v. Wade 
decision, though morally objectionable to some, were within the 
"certain private sphere of individual liberties that will be kept 
largely beyond the reach of government."66 Therefore, though the 
court did not attempt to invalidate all state restrictions 
concerning the abortion rights of women and minors, it plainly 
and with unmistakable language informed states that they must 
guarantee and p~otect these freedoms women enjoy. Any regulation 
59 See supra note 2. 
60 See supra note 2. 
61 See supra note 1. 
62 See supra note 2. 
63 See supra note 2. 
64 See supra note 58, 
65 See supra note 58, 
slip op. at 16-18. 
slip op. at 18-22. 
66 See supra note 58, slip op. at 25, (emphasis added) . 
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imposed on women that restricts their access or the desirability 
of having an abortion must rationally and legitimately serve 
proper state goals. 
conclusion 
The proposed Virginia legislation provides every alternative 
that the court requires, and includes no provision previously 
invalidated. The legislation denotes the unique nature and the 
special medical problems of pregnancy and abortion. The proposed 
statutes would not apply where a medical emergency exists that 
complicates the pregnancy and threatens the life of the mother to 
the extent that in the physician's best medical judgement an 
abortion is warranted. 67 The statute also does not allow a 
judicial veto. of an abortion decision of a minor after the minor 
has been declared mature and capable of consent. 68 It therefore 
appears that the proposed legislation is constitutional under 
current case law. 
This work however discusses solely the legal ramifications 
of abortion consent statutes. The moral, ethical, and practical 
considerations of children bearing children are problems of much 
greater magnitude. Abortion rights are hotly debated in our 
society today, and it appears that the current membership of the 
United states Supreme Court affirm that right. Women's activists 
fear that state restriction of the abortion right will lead to a 
return to the days of "back alley abortion clinics" which brought 
horror and destruction to the lives of innocent young women. 
These are the moral, political, and ethical questions that face 
Virginians in the consideration of proposed consent statutes. 
This policy decision by the General Assembly will determine 
whether or not a consent statute becomes law in Virginia. 
67 Senate bill number 342, at 4. 
68 Ibid. See also Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, at 1001 
(D. Mass. 1978) (Bellotti III) (upon a finding of maturity and informed 
consent, state is no longer entitled to impose restriction upon the young 
woman's decision). 
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VIRGINIA'S INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS: 
THE NEW COURTS SCOPE AND POWER 
D.E. Barney· 
The Scope of the Problem: Appellate Inundation 
The increased number of lawsuits brought in state trial 
courts in the past quarter century has strained the capacity of 
state supreme courts .to hear all valid appeals. Meritorius 
petitions for appeal meet denial or cursory decisions which fail 
to develop important legal doctrine. As a result, many states 
have enacted legislation creating intermediate appellate courts 
to reduce the burden on the state supreme court in order that 
that tribunal might fulfill its obligation to settle developing 
areas of law. In general, the intermediate courts in the various 
states hear appeals that turn on reversible error in the trial 
judgment. Harder questions of constitutional, statutory, and 
cornmon law interpretation pass to the state supreme court for 
hearing. Weisberger, pp. 239-240. 
The Virginia Legislature created the Court of Appeals, 
effective January 1, 1985, in response to a fourfold increase in 
the number of petitions to the Supreme Court during the past two 
decades. Brissette, p. 209. Some controversy surrounded the 
reformation of the appeals process, including practitioners' 
concerns over the increased costs of more frequent and dual 
appeals. Some fear existed that important cases worthy of 
consideration by the Supreme Court might meet final judgment in 
the lower court. Scalia and Lilly, pp. 56-60. The statutory 
scheme promulgated by the Legislature finesses these difficulties 
17 
by granting the Court of Appeals broad jurisdiction and power of 
finality while reserving to the Supreme Court discretionary 
review of all Court of Appeals decisions. Va. Code Sect. 
17-116.05-.08. At this early date in the Court of Appeals' 
history, the new Court appears ready to manage the flood of 
petitions for appeal with minimum disruption of Virginia litiga-
tion. 
The Court of Appeals' Jurisdiction and Discretionry Review 
The Intermediate Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction 
in matters of contempt, injunctions, writs of mandamus, prohibi-
tion and habeas corpus. The statute grants appellate jurisdic-
tion for appeals from circuit Courts' review of administrative 
agency determinations, final decisions of the Industrial Commis-
sion of Virginia, and final judgments from the Circuit Courts 
concerning all domestic relations cases. Further, all convic-
tions for crimes or traffic infractions are appealable to the new 
court, except where the death penalty arises. (Death sentences 
are appealable directly to. the Virginia Supreme Court.) Va. Code 
sect. 17-116.04-.05.1. These appeals are of right. Va. Code 
Sect. 17-116.05.2. The statutory scheme provides that the 
decision of the Court of Appeals shall be final, without appeal 
of right to the Supreme Court in traffic and misdemeanor convic-
tions having no -jail sentence, administrative or Industrial 
Commission cases, or domestic relations cases. Va. Code Sect.-
17-116.07. 
A problem inherent in dividing appellate jurisdiction 
between an intermediate court and the supreme court of a state 
arises because relative importance of legal issues cannot be 
consistently based upon dollar amount or subject matter. "All 
tort cases are not of negligible social importance; nor are all 
cases raising constitutional issues of general public concern--if 
for no other reason than that the issue is frivolous." Scalia 
and Lilly, pp. 47-50. Any type of case can present a legal issue 
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worthy of determination of the state supreme court. Intermediate 
court jurisdiction must not preclude discretionary high court 
review of sociplly important cases. Judge Scalia and Professor 
Lilly suggested in 1971 that two factors be considered in 
weighing the "importance" of a case for discretionary review of 
the intermediate court's decision. First, the significance of 
the appeal to the entire legal system, such as a case where 
limited private interests turn on an unsettled point of state 
law, needs to be considered. Secondly, the importance of the 
appeal to the involved parties should affect the high court's 
discretionary review. An appealed death sentence or huge civil 
damages award may turn on only a factual distinction, but the 
weighty individual interests involved may merit review in the 
state's highest court. id. The Virginia Legislature allowed for 
certification of appeals to the Supreme Court on motion of the 
Court of Appeals or on the motion of the high court itself, 
within the Supreme Court's discretion. Va. Code Sect. 
17-116.06. This statutory feature ensures that important cases 
meriting high court review are not blocked by an overly deter-
ministic legislative scheme. 
Placing final review of all appeals within the discretion of 
the virginia supreme Court alleviates the burden on litigants of 
repeated appeals as of right. Resistance to this type of 
appellate reform arises from the ranks of trial attorneys as the 
spectre of protracted appeals clogs the courts and delays final 
decisions. Allowing a second appeal to the Supreme Court only 
when that body determines such review warranted in the particular 
situation makes the vast majority of Court of Appeals decisions 
final, while assuring that important cases are certified to the 
Supreme Court. This is the model suggested by the American Bar 
Association, and followed by the majority of states which have an 
intermediate division. Brissette, p. 224. This model also 
allows appellate development of factual and legal issues in 
specific cases before the Supreme Court passes judgment on the 
significance of the case. id. at 229. The Florida scheme allows 
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parties to petition the intermediate court to bypass that court 
and appeal directly to the Florida Supreme Court. If the 
intermediate court determines that the appeal merits high court 
review, they grant the bypass petition. This scheme runs the 
risk that legally significant appeals may be herd in the interme-
diate court by that tribunal, without oversight by the highest 
court. id. at 225. The Virginia statute ensures that all 
petitions will be examined for merit by the Supreme Court, while 
maintaining the docket control of channeling through the Interme-
diate Court of Appeals. 
Finally, the statutory scheme enacted in Va. Code Sect. 17-
116 provides the element of control required by the late expan-
sion of Virginia's judicial process. The crucial discretionary 
oversight of all appeals heard in the Court of Appeals provides a 
simple and direct method of certifying legally significant 
appeals to the Supreme Court. The granting of appellate juris-
diction in the Court of Appeals creates an organized management 
of an ever-increasing number of appeals of trial jUdgments within 
the Commonwealth. This reformed appellate process ensures 
ordered control of a burgeoning docket while vesting final 
judgment in what is legally significant in Virginia case law 
firmly in the Virginia Supreme Court. 
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The author wishes to apologize for the informal nature of 
these notes. Production exigencies required that these be pre-
sented in this format. 
MARITAL RAPE: THE LEGISLATIVE BATTLE 
Sherri Davis * 
Introduction 
Society recognizes rape as one of the most serious violent 
crimes, one which scars its victims emotionally as well as 
physically. Despite its seriousness, it has been only recently 
that state lawmaking bodies have given attention to the wide-
spread crime of marital rape. 
Marital rape has the potential to be even more traumatic to 
a victim than rape by a stranger. Indeed, "when you are raped by 
a stranger you have to live with a frightening memory. When you 
are raped by your husband, you have to live with your rapist."l 
Al though there are few statistics reporting the incidence of 
marital rape, it is believed that 14% of all married women are 
victims of this crime. 2 There is no consensus among sociologists 
as to why marital rape occurs; however, it is agreed that state 
statutory marital rape exemptions may contribute to the accep-
tance of this conduct. 
Legislatures have been reluctant to change or abolish the 
traditional marital rape exemptions of state law. As recently as 
1980, 44 states through their marital rape exemption statutes 
recognized the right of a husband to force his wife to have 
1 Dr. David Finkelhor in testimony supporting New Hampshire H.B. 516, 
eliminating the marital rape exemption to sexual offenses, to the Judiciary 
Committee, New Hampshire state Le:)islature (Mar. 25, 1981). 
2 D. Russell, Rape in Marriage, 2 (1982); this author received funding 
from the National Institute of Mental Health to corrluct a study on the 
incidence of marital rape. 
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sexual relations. In the past six years, however, in response to 
both judicial decisions struggling with the implications of 
marital rape exemptions and increasing public recognition of the 
problem of marital rape, more than 17 states have modified their 
rape statutes to allow for prosecution of spousal rape. 
Historical Justifications of the Marital Rape Exemption 
Marital rape exemptions in this country were adopted from 
the English common law exemption, first articulated in 1736 by 
English Chief Justice Matthew Hale in History of the Pleas of 
Crown: 
:"[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by 
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up 
herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot 
retract.... [I]n marriage she hath given up her body 
to her husband ... "3 
This matrimonial consent theory was justified by common law 
assumptions that upon marriage, a wife became the property of her 
husband or that the spouses became one entity. Legally, then, a 
husband could not be guilty of assaulting or raping chattel, or 
in the latter case, himself. Al though these assumptions were 
effectively invalidated by the Married Women's Property Acts 
adopted in the 1800's, marital rape exemptions were not contem-
poraneously abolished. In addition, proponents began to advance 
more practical arguments in support of the marital rape exemp-
tion. 
The possibility of fabricated complaints is an often cited 
reason for retaining the exemption, however, the danger of false 
charges is apt to arise in the context of any statutory crime. 
3 1 Hale, Pleas of the crown, 628-29 (1736). 
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Furthermore, the stigma associated with rape discourages marital 
rape victims in particular from fabricating complaints. Practi-
tioners favoring the exemption also point to the evidentiary 
problems associated with proving lack of consent, but this 
difficulty is inherent to all rape prosecutions, not just those 
of marital rape. Courts have similarly dismissed these legal 
rationales for the marital rape exemption. 4 
Defendants of the exemption have also attemtped to justify 
it based on the argument that allowing prosecution of husbands 
for rape would disrupt or impede reconciliation of troubled mar-
riages.5 As the virginia supreme Court observed, lilt is hard to 
imagine how charging a husband with the violent crime of rape can 
be more disruptive to marriages than the violent act itself."6 
As commentators have noted, both the antiquated notion of 
male supremacy in marriage and the various policy arguments 
advanced in support of the marital rape exemption cannot be 
accepted in contemporary American society.7 
Toward Nationwide Reform 
state courts have only recently challenged the arguments for 
4 See e.g. People v. Stefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 515, 121 Misc. 2d 113 
(1983) . 
5 Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 stan. L. Rev. 
719, 725 (1954). 
6 Weishaupt v. Virginia, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984). 
7 See e.g. S. Barry, Spousal Rape: The Uncommon Law 66 A.B.A. J. 1088 
(1980). 
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retaining the marital rape exemption and state legislatures have 
been slower to take the cue. state rape laws presently run the 
gamut from barring prosacution of Hvoluntary social companionsH 
to total abolition of the marital rape exemption. [See North 
Dakota Code XXXXX and New Jersey Code XXXXX.J 
A majority of amended statutes allowing prosecution of the 
crime of marital rape include requirements of separation or 
"living apart" at the time the offense was committed. [See 
Colorado Code XXXXX. J Some of these states have gone a step 
further, and require that one party have made a f il ing for 
divorce. [See Wisc. Stat. Ann. 940.225(6). J Other states have 
combined these requirements and have taken the approach that 
prosecution may be had if the parties were living apart or if one 
party had filed for divorce when the alleged rape occurred. 
The various statutes allowing prosecution of marital rape 
also impose time limitations for reporting of the crime by the 
victim, and in some cases, require that the complainant prove 
serious bodily injury. [See california Code XXXXX and W. Va. 
Code Ann. 61-88-6 (1984).J 
Although these statutory requirements are intended· to 
circumvent the problems with marital rape prosecutions, they 
operate in some cases as severe prosecution limitations and may 
also cause interpretation problems for the courts. However, this 
progress in modifying the statutory bar to marital rape prosecu-
tions is a step toward the larger goal of ensuring that rape laws 
protect a woman's bodily autonomy. 
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